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Abstract:
Between 1899 to 1956 the United Kingdom ruled Sudan through the AngloEgyptian Condominium. During this period of colonial rule, British administrators divided
the country into two distinct regions, North and South Sudan. Through a process called
the ‘Southern Policy’, South Sudan was administered separately from the more
economically developed North. The policy was intended as a protectionist barrier to
prevent the exploitation of the economically underdeveloped south by the north.
However, due to Britain’s laissez-faire economic policy in South Sudan, the southern
regions were excluded from the government-sponsored economic development of the
north, such as the Gezira Irrigation Scheme. The result of Britain’s colonial policies was
the hegemonic domination of the North over the South. Furthermore, the incorporation
of Northern elites into the colonial administration ensured that this unjust and
inequitable power structure would continue throughout the postcolonial era.
The economic, educational, and political benefits rendered upon the North,
compared to the neglect and expropriation inflicted upon the South led to a vastly
disproportionate balance of power in the independent Sudanese Government. This
power disparity was the direct cause of the Sudanese Civil War, fought between 1956
and 2005.
When South Sudan gained full independence in 2011, it entered statehood as
one of the poorest, least developed nations in the world. The century of neglect under
the British and of violence and oppression under the North Sudanese left the fledgling
country with an insecure future. Two years after gaining its independence, South Sudan
was again thrust back into civil conflict. South Sudan’s history of civil war is a result of
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the oppression and underdevelopment inflicted by Britain’s colonial administration and
the Northern-dominated Sudanese Government.
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Introduction
On April 15, 2014 a company of armed fighters captured the city of Bentiu, the
capital of the South Sudanese state of Unity. The citizens of Bentiu may have had hope
that the rebels, primarily of the Nuer ethnic group, would be liberators. However, their
optimism was short-lived. As the city fell, rampaging gunmen perpetrated one of the
deadliest massacres of the 21st century. Directed by commanders on local radio
stations, rebel troops went door to door committing indiscriminate atrocities. After two
days of bloodshed, hundreds lay dead. When United Nations observers and
peacekeepers arrived on the scene, the rebels had vanished, leaving piles of bodies
and shattered lives in their wake. One UN observer reported “A strong stench of
decomposing remains filled the air, while vultures and dogs ate off limbs, scalps and
abdomen flesh.”1 The mutilated corpses conjure images of Nanking in 1938 or
Rwanda in 1994. An official White House statement read, “Accounts of the attacks
shock the conscience. It’s an abomination.” 2 Gut-wrenching experiences have become
a facet of daily life in the war-ravaged nation of South Sudan.
The Bentiu massacre was not an isolated event, nor was it the first escalation of
violence in South Sudan by belligerents in the nation’s five-year long civil war. South
Sudan, the world’s youngest country, has been embroiled in civil conflict for the entirety
of its independent history. The Council on Foreign Relations estimates that 50,000
people have been killed since 2013, with over four million being forced to flee their

Fred Barbash, "An ‘Abomination’: Slaughter in The Mosques and Churches of Bentiu, South Sudan", Washington
Post, 2014, accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/04/23/anabomination-slaughter-in-the-mosques-and-churches-of-bentiu-south-sudan/?utm_term=.e99810971b93.
2
Barbash, “Abomination.”
1

Lin 4
homes, and an additional five million are at risk of starvation. 3 The mounting atrocities
committed by all sides in this complex conflict have garnered attention from media and
academics. Since 2013, politicians and experts in foreign relations and international
development have been trying to unravel this labyrinthine conflict. Many simplistically
attribute the violence to ethnic tension or political inexperience. However, as I argue in
this paper, South Sudan’s history of internal strife did not begin in 2011 when it gained
independence from the North, nor did it begin in 1956, when the united Sudan gained
impendence from Great Britain. The South Sudanese Civil War is the result of the
neglect, underdevelopment, and mismanagement perpetrated by Britain’s colonial
administration and perpetuated by the Northern-dominated Sudanese government
during the united era (1956-2011). This conflict must be reframed from a result of ethnic
differences and political inexperience in a young country, to the postcolonial product of
unstable political systems, pervasive underdevelopment and extreme competition for
resources.
Literature Review:
South Sudan is not unique in its postcolonial history. The Sudanese postcolonial
experience is mirrored in former colonial holdings throughout the Global South. The
practice of artificially elevating specific sects of society through indirect rule creates
unstable power dynamics that often lead the country into civil conflict. This phenomenon
was seen in the Congo and Rwanda under Belgian rule, and French Mali and Chad.
Regarding this phenomenon, Paul Collier wrote, societies that have one group that is
large enough to form a majority of the population, but where other groups are still
"Global Conflict Tracker", Cfr.Org, last modified 2018, accessed February 14, 2018,
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/civil-war-in-south-sudan.
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significant— what we call “ethnic dominance”—are indeed more at risk.” 4 The colonial
model employed in these holdings focused on resource extraction, not settlement. In an
attempt to combat the extensive financial and human demands of traditional
colonialism, colonizers began shifting to indirect rule. This colonial framework relies on
the subversion of existing power structures, rather than the creation of new ones.
Indirect rule artificially sustains a hierarchy, often times religious or ethnic, and allows
unstable power structures to survive. Furthermore, it positions those at the top of the
hierarchy to succeed the colonial government in the postcolonial era. These dynamics
are very much in play in postcolonial Sudan.
There is a substantial volume of literature regarding the Sudanese Civil War, and
the genocide in Darfur, beginning in 2003, drew the attention of media outlets across
the world. As one of the world’s deadliest conflict zones, the contemporary South
Sudanese Civil War receives considerable media and scholarly attention. Clemence
Pinaud theorizes that the development of wartime power structures stemming from the
fifty-year civil war created deep divisions within South Sudanese society, leading to the
current civil war. She wrote, “predation by armed groups during the second civil war
(1983–2005) initiated a process of dominant class formation, and demonstrates how,
through various strategies of resource capture and kinship networks, commanders from
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other factions formed a new
aristocracy.” 5 Pinaud’s analysis hinges upon the idea that divisions among ethnic

Paul Collier, Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 28.
5
Clemence Pinaud, "South Sudan: Civil War, Predation and the Making of o Military Aristocracy", African Affairs
113, no. 451 (2014): 192-211, accessed March 2, 2018,
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy.seattleu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=8f175f4e-2c13-4dbf9901-fafe912d9676%40sessionmgr102.
4
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groups led to the fragmentation of the SPLA, and as the population became increasing
militarized, the prospect of civil conflict became inevitable. Brosché and Höglund take a
similar contemporary approach to their conflict analysis. They conclude that the South
Sudanese Civil War stems from weak constitutional institutions within the transitionary
government, which led to inherent political instability in the fledgling country. This
instability manifested itself in the political split between President Salva Kiir and VicePresident Riek Machar. 6 The conclusions reached by Pinaud, Brosché, and Höglund,
while cogent in their analysis, fail to consider the historical factors that contributed to the
instability and civil war throughout Sudan’s history, namely, the legacy of
underdevelopment and oppression by Britain’s colonial administration and the
independent Sudanese government. There have been relatively few publications linking
the current events in South Sudan to the colonial era. This paper will connect the
colonial era (1889 -1956) with the united Sudanese era (1956-2011) to the
contemporary civil conflict (2013-).

Pre-Colonial History and Geography
On the eve of Britain’s formal colonization of Sudan in 1899, the country was far
from homogenous, politically or ethnically. The geographic area of Sudan is diverse as it
is vast, formerly comprising the largest country in Africa and home to hundreds of
distinct ethnic groups. 7 The most significant fissure is along the North-South axis, which

Johan Brosché and Kristine Höglund, "Crisis of Governance in South Sudan: Electoral Politics And Violence In The
World's Newest Nation", The Journal of Modern African Studies 54, no. 01 (2016): 67-90, accessed March 11, 2018,
https://search-proquestcom.proxy.seattleu.edu/docview/1763352604/abstract/62B141EDD0BE4643PQ/1?accountid=28598.
7
Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.
6
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divides the country not only geographically, but politically, religiously, and ethnically.
Northern Sudanese derive their cultural identity from their religion, with an
overwhelming majority adhering to Sunni Islam. Conversely, South Sudan is far more
diverse from the North, both religiously and ethnically. However, South Sudan has
traditionally been dominated by the two largest ethnic groups, the Nuer and the Dinka.
Sudan is as diverse geographically as it is culturally. The northern regions of
Sudan suffer from a dearth of potable water due to its extremely hot and arid climate, as
well as encroaching desertification. In contrast to the North, Southern Sudan
experiences a tropical, equatorial climate, conducive to agriculture, which was the
region’s primary industry until the discovery of petroleum in the 1970s.
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Figure 1: Religion and Language Breakdown of Sudan 8

In 1821, the Northern regions of Sudan fell under the personal rule of
Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt. Collins theorizes that a primary
motivation for Ali’s invasion of Sudan was the acquisition of slaves for his private army. 9
Islamic law, or Sharia law, prohibits the capture of Muslims for the purpose of
enslavement, leaving Ali with one logical source for slaves, the predominantly Christian
and Animist South Sudan. At the height of this slave trade in 1860, an estimated 15,000
slaves were sent North every year. 10 The North-South slave trade implemented by the
Turko-Egyptian regime sowed the seeds of hegemony and Northern dominance that
would persist for two centuries.
In 1881, a boat-builder named Muhammad Ahmed ibn Abdallah claimed to have
received visions from the Prophet Muhammad, who declared him the Mahdi. 11 Abdallah
amassed thousands of followers, primarily Orthodox Muslims throughout Northern and
Central Sudan, by promoting his movement as a return to Islamic fundamentalism. In
the same year, Abdallah declared a jihad, or holy war, against the Turko-Egyptian
regime, who he claimed were heretics and infidels. By 1885, Abdallah’s forces captured
Khartoum, formally establishing the Mahdist Regime.

Sergio Pecanha, "The Tough Task of Defining Sudan’s North-South Border - Map - Nytimes.Com", Nytimes.Com,
last modified 2018, accessed March 1, 2018,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/01/16/world/africa/sudan-graphic.html.
9
Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 12.
10
Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 16.
11
Mahdi translates to ‘guided one’ or ‘messiah’. In Sunni Islam the Mahdi is a companion of Isa (Jesus) and will
bring justice to the world.
8
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In 1898, the Mahdist forces were decisively defeated at the Battle of Omdurman
by an Anglo-Egyptian army. Mahdist casualties numbered 26,000, compared to 430 for
the Anglo-Egyptian side. Regarding the battle, a young Winston Churchill wrote, “it is
the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians. Within the
space of five hours the strongest and best-armed savage army yet arrayed against a
modern European Power had been destroyed and dispersed, with hardly any
difficulty.” 12 This racist and condescending summation was emblematic of senior British
officials the colonial era and would manifest itself during Britain’s administration of
Sudan. In 1899, the British Empire, in a joint venture with Egypt, established the AngloEgyptian condominium of Sudan, formalizing their control of the country.
Patterns of Colonization
Britain’s interest in Sudan must be contextualized within the larger ‘Scramble for
Africa’ movement in the latter half of the 19th century. For the wealthy and industrialized
European powers, Africa offered secondary markets for manufactured goods and a
seemingly endless source of raw materials, principally rubber, cotton, ivory, and gold. At
the Berlin Conference of 1884, Britain’s claim to Sudan was formalized among
European powers. It should be noted that no African representatives participated in or
were invited to this conference.
Similar to Britain’s colonial project in India, the colonial administration in Sudan
took the form of indirect rule. Traditionally, indirect rule refers to the use of indigenous
leaders govern under the supervision of colonial administrators. However, Collin
Newbury would have us revise this definition to include a clientelist model that imposes
Winston S. Churchill, The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of The Sudan (New York, NY: Carroll and Graf
Publishers, 2000), 300.

12
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an ethnic hierarchy. Newbury also states that there is a notion of modus vivendi, or
complicity by those at the top of the hierarchy. 13 In Sudan, this theory is supported by
the British elevation of Northern Muslim elites into the colonial administration. In return
for this patronage, client classes (Northern, Arab, Muslim, elites) lent legitimacy and a
degree of stability to the colonial administration.
Colonial Policy in Practice
Through a process called the ‘Southern Policy’, South Sudan was administered
separately from the more economically developed north. The Southern Policy
delineated race by religion. The stated aim of the Southern Policy was “keep the
Southern Sudan as free as possible of Mohammedan influence." 14 The British
administration devoted significantly more resources to development in the North than in
the South, particularly in the fields of education and industry. This unequal distribution of
resources and capital contributed to the Northern domination over the South in the
independent era and established a hegemony that pervaded Sudanese political and
economic society until 2011, when the South gained independence. The result was the
severe underdevelopment of South Sudan.
British mismanagement of Sudan stemmed from a disastrous failure in long-term
planning. Officials within the British administration had not intended for the North and
South to become a single state in the independent era. Instead, many within the
Sudanese colonial administration intended for South Sudan to gain official emancipation

Colin Walter Newbury, "Patrons, Clients, And Empire: The Subordination of Indigenous Hierarchies In Asia And
Africa", Journal of World History 11, no. 2 (2000): 227-263, accessed March 9, 2018,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078850.
14
M. Abdel Rahim, "The Development of British Policy in The Southern Sudan 1899–1947", Middle Eastern
Studies 2, no. 3 (1966): 227-249, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282161, 230.
13
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from the North and join British East Africa (Kenya and Uganda). Harold MacMichael, a
senior British civil secretary announced that “the administration of the South was to be
developed along ‘African’, rather than ‘Arab’ lines, and that the future of southern Sudan
might ultimately lie with the countries of British East Africa, rather than with the Middle
East. 15 An official memorandum to the Milner Mission stated, “The possibility of the
Southern (black) portion of the Sudan being eventually cut off from the Northern (Arab)
area and linked up with some Central African system is borne in mind.” 16 Under this
system, Southern regional governors were not invited to attend the annual conferences
of governors in Khartoum, and were instead encouraged to collaborate with British
administrators in Uganda and Kenya.
The Southern Policy manifested itself in the form of the Closed District Order and
the Permits to Trade Order. Traders and travelers required special permits from the
British government to cross regional borders in the South. As a result, the southern
regions remained largely pastoral while the North experience economic advancements,
particularly in the petroleum industry. Wealth and industry was contained in the northern
regions as a result of these British policies.
British Education Policy
In 1902, Britain founded Gordon College in Khartoum. 17 Sharkey claims that
British administrators had hoped Gordon College would become the “Eton of the Sudan”
or the “Winchester by the Nile”, plainly, a school for well-born young men to receive the
necessary training to enter into the British colonial administration. She writes, “Above

Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press,
2004), 11.
16
Rahim, "The Development of British Policy in The Southern Sudan."
17
In 1956, Gordon College was renamed as the University of Khartoum. Today it is the largest university in Sudan.
15
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all, they enrolled students from Arabic-speaking, Muslim families that claimed Arab
genealogies and hailed from the riverain North.” 18 Furthermore, Southern students
were prohibited from traveling North in pursuit of education as a result of the
aforementioned Closed District Order. Graduates of Gordon college would form the core
of Sudanese political society, both during the British colonial administration and during
the early years of the independent era. Sharkey details the effect that Britain’s favoring
of the already elevated social classes had on Sudanese society, writing, “Educated
Northerners imagined a nation that took its territorial shape from the colony but its
cultural shape from themselves. In writings and speeches, they affirmed Arabic and
Islam as the pillars of the nation.” Ironically, though Northern Sudanese expressed their
desire to shape the independent Sudan in their own image, free from colonial influence,
when independence came, they maintained the British system of Northern hegemony
over the South. Sharkey also addresses the structural inequality instituted by the British.
“Rather than reshuffling this social hierarchy [Northern hegemony], British authorities
reinforced it by setting policies for school enrollment according to gender, region of
origin, social status and religion, Admissions policies for Gordon College for example,
privileged those who were male, Muslim, Arabic-speaking, ‘Arab’, and of high status.”
This method of administration is known as indirect rule i.e. manipulating local institutions
to maintain control and influence. This system of favoring Northern Muslim students
over Southerners created a system that excluded Southerners from the colonial
administration and from the Sudanese government once the nation gained
independence in 1956.
Heather J. Sharkey, Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003), 7-8.
18
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British education policy in the South was far more informal than in the North. By
its own admission, the British colonial administration made few attempts at organizing
state-sponsored educational institutions in the South, such as the North’s prestigious
Gordon College. The administration delegated responsibility for education development
in South to Christian missionary groups, whose primary goal was proselytization.
Regarding the education disparity between the North and South, the British GovernorGeneral of Sudan in 1921 wrote, "As regards education, in the Northern Sudan, of
course, the Government schools have always been the main recruiting grounds for
clerical and junior technical staff. In the [South] it has not been possible to do very
much.” 19 This refusal or inability to devote resources to education programs in the
South set the region on the path to failure. When Sudan gained independence, the
overwhelming majority of government officials were supplied from the North, allowing
the government to continue its neglectful and abusive policies towards the South.
State Economic Policy in British Sudan
During its administration, Britain heavily invested in economic development
schemes in Northern Sudan. The administration’s economic policy in the South during
the same period can best be described as laissez-faire, or non-interventionist. This
policy is exemplified by the Gezira Irrigation Scheme. A massive capital investment by
the British, the Gezira scheme consisted of 2,700 miles of irrigation ditches and canals
in Northern Sudan. Douglas claims that the scheme “enabled the Sudan to enter the
international cotton trade. No similar schemes were attempted in the South until after

H. W. Jackson, Report on The Finances, Administration and Condition of The Soudan in 1921 (Khartoum:
Governor-General of the Soudan, 1921).
19
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the war, and then very hurriedly and with unsatisfactory results.” 20 That no masscultivation projects were attempted in the South despite the region’s suitable climate is
telling of Britain’s overall economic objectives in Sudan. The lack of capital investment
in the South, combined with the Closed Districts and Permit to Trade orders, ensured
that the southern regions of Sudan would enter independence at a severe economic
disadvantage to the North.
British Social and Economic Policy
Britain’s method of rule also had the effect of creating horizontal inequalities and
fostering historical grievances among ethnic groups that would later play a significant
role in the current civil conflict in South Sudan. Cosgrove states that horizontal
inequality isn’t just about income inequality between groups, but also inequality across
capabilities – political participation, access to health, education and other public
services, and cultural entitlements – as well. 21 Indirect rule exacerbates these dynamics
by artificially elevating certain ethnic groups. These strucutes are particularly prevalent
within the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. South Sudan’s geography and the pastoral
nature of its population meant that the British ‘pacification’ of the South was slow and
uneven. In an effort to hasten their efforts and bolster their tax revenue, Britain
employed soldiers from the Dinka ethnic group as an irregular militia. Thomas writes,
“Dinka individuals who had formerly allied themselves to slavers were used in violent
campaigns to pacify and tax Nuer communities.” 22 This system created deep fractures
within South Sudan’s already diverse ethnic communities. The hostility between Dinka

Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, 17.
Serena Cosgrove, "Conflict and Poverty", in Understanding Global Poverty: Causes, Capabilities, And Human
Development, 1st ed. (London: Routledge Press, 2017) 176.
22
Edward Thomas, South Sudan: A Slow Liberation (London: Zed, 2015) 74.
20
21
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and Nuer groups is a dominant facet of the current civil war in South Sudan. The British
colonial policy in Sudan developed unsustainable power structures between the North
and the South, and between ethnic groups in the South. The result of this
mismanagement, underdevelopment, and neglect was the Northern dominance and
hegemony within the independent Sudanese government.
It was not until the Juba Conference of 1947 that the decision was made to unite
North and South Sudan into a single nation. Regarding this abrupt change in policy,
Governor-General Sir Hubert Huddleston wrote:
The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to
act upon the facts that the peoples of the Sudan are distinctively African
and Negroid, but the geography and economics combine (so far as can be
seen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future
development to the Middle Eastern and Arabicized Northern Sudan; and
therefore sot ensure that they should by educational and economic
development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as
socially and economically the equals of their partners in the Sudan of the
future. 23

Ironically, the exploitation of the less developed South by the more developed North
was a point of concern for British administrators; however, unification was deemed to be
the most equitable solution. One regional governor believed that unification would be
the least problematic future for the country, writing:
The best future we [the British] can give the South is federation with the
North on equal footing and that we should not cloud the issue now by
vague promises of self-determination in the South which would antagonise
Northern opinion and raise false hopes in the South. We took over the
trusteeship of one united Sudan and as one united Sudan we should hand
back the trusteeship to a Government of Northern and Southern
Sudanese. 24

23
24

Mohamed Omar Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background in Conflict (London: Praeger, 1968), 62-63.
Omar Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background in Conflict, 64.
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British administrators showed little foresight in their belief that a nominal state would
negate the half-century of hegemony that the North enjoyed under colonial rule.
Furthermore, to describe colonialism as ‘trusteeship’ is indicative of the arrogant,
Kiplingesque attitude with which Britain approached their colonial project. Mohamed
Abdel Rahim describes the effect of Britain’s failure, “Southern Policy was by far the
greatest failure of that Administration and there can be no doubt that by implementing it
the Condominium regime has landed the independent Sudan with its most intractable
problem and the present generation of Sudanese people, with the greatest challenge in
their post-independence history.” 25 Britain’s long-term planning failures led to South
Sudan being ill-prepared to join the independent nation of Sudan. The result of this
failure was the primacy of the North Sudanese government, which allowed the failed
British policies regarding South Sudan to remain in place.
Northern Domination in Independent Sudan
On January 1st, 1956 Sudan gained its independence from Britain. The
Sudanese government, based in the Northern city of Khartoum, was dominated by elite,
Northern, Arab, Muslim men. The result was the general continuation of Britain’s
negligent policy regarding the country’s Southern regions. Regarding the power
dynamics in independent Sudan, Rahim wrote, “The southern Sudanese lagged far
behind many of the northern Sudanese in education, economic development, and
involvement in the government and administration of the country. In consequence, they
lacked any real or potential voice in the direction of the country’s affairs.” 26 This
precarious situation is a direct result of the British colonial polices. In London, Sudanese
25
26

Rahim, "The Development of British Policy in The Southern Sudan.”
Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 16.
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independence may have appeared to be a successful devolutionary transfer of power to
native populations. However, in South Sudan, independence was preempted by an
army mutiny that would place the new nation on the path to civil war. The Sudanese
Civil War would cause the deaths of three million people between 1955 to 2005. 27
A leading cause of the first outbreak of civil war was Southern fears of Northern
exploitation in the united era. Johnson wrote, “The rapid increase of Northerners in the
South as administrators, senior officers in the army and police, teachers in government
schools. And as merchants, increased Southern fears of Northern domination and
colonization.” 28 South Sudanese leaders advocated for a federalist government model,
which was explicitly rejected by the Northern government officials who sought to
centralize political power in Khartoum and enforce Islamic religious and cultural values
in the South. The 1955 Mutiny was desultory in its aims and had limited success.
However, in retaliation for the mutiny, Northern soldiers burned villages, arrested
Southern leaders, and tortured civilians. 29 The result was the further mobilization of
South Sudanese civilians and the birth of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
(SSLM), the military and political force of South Sudan the initial stage of the civil war.
It would be a mistake to assume that mutual persecution by the Northern
government fostered unity among the disparate ethnic groups in the South. The nature
of the war prevented large-scale cooperation between bands of Southern fighters.
Johnson characterizes the Southerners as divided and isolated. He writes, “By modern
standards, the first years of the war were very modestly conducted. The guerrillas were

In 1972 the Addis Ababa Agreement led to an 11-year ceasefire. However, due to the informal and multifactional nature of the war, raiding and border clashes would occur until war was again declared in 1983.
28
Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, 27.
29
Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 31.
27
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knit together very loosely and had no external military support, arming themselves
mainly by theft from police outposts, the occasional ambush of army patrols, or through
the defection of Southern police or soldiers.” 30 Rather than direct confrontation, much of
the conflict took the form of raiding of civilian population centers. As many as 500,000
people were killed in the initial phase of the civil war, many of whom were noncombatants.
The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 brought a temporary halt to violence and
eleven years of relative peace to Sudan, despite ongoing engagements by guerilla and
irregular military forces. The agreement provided for limited autonomy in the South,
particularly in cultural and religious matters. A tentative coexistence lasted until 1978,
with the discovery of oil in South Sudan. After five years of increasing encroachments
by the Northern government into the oil-rich regions of South Sudan, President Gaafar
Nimeiry declared Shari’a in the South, dissolved the Southern Sudan Autonomous
Region, and abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983.
In July of 1983, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) published a manifesto detailing the reasons
for their revolution. Regarding this manifesto, Johnson states, “Underdevelopment was
identified as characterizing most of Sudan outside of the Central Region, the site of
most colonial and postcolonial investment. This pattern of unequal development
continued after independence because the majority of post-independence governments,
it was claimed, had been in the hands of people from the most developed areas.” 31 The
factors the led to the renewed outbreak of civil war (underdevelopment, competition for
30
31

Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 31.
Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 32.
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resources, and Northern hegemony), are directly attributable to the political and
economic systems developed by the British during their colonial rule. The second
outbreak of civil war in 1983 is characterized by its high civilian death toll, human rights
violations, and war crimes. It is estimated that as many as 2 million people died in the
conflict, many being non-combatants.

32

Figure 2: War-related deaths in Sudan 1983-2005.30

Similarly, to the first instance of civil war, Southern forces in 1983 became fragmented
as competing factions vied for leadership within the movement. In 1991, Riek Machar,
the future vice-president and rebel leader, and other Nuer leaders split from the official
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This ethnic factionalism set the stage
for the later fragmenting of South Sudan’s post-independence government.
Effects of Civil War on Independent South Sudan

"Sudan: 1985 – 2005 | Mass Atrocity Endings", Tufts.Edu, last modified 2018, accessed March 1, 2018,
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2nd-civil-war-darfur/.

32
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The Second Sudanese Civil War consumed nearly two million lives in addition to
untold human and physical capital. 33 The decades of strife left 51 percent of children
without any formal education. Furthermore, over 16,000 children were used as child
soldiers. The staggering loss of human, physical, and financial capital was the legacy of
the Sudanese Civil War. South Sudan entered independence as one of the poorest,
least developed countries in the world. It consistently ranks at or near the bottom of
every development index (see Table 1). This pervasive poverty has directly contributed
to South Sudan’s current civil conflict. As a result, competition for resources led to
raiding and increased ethnic violence. Serena Cosgrove and Ben Curtis claim, “reiflict
occurs.” 34 South Sudan exemplifies this relationship between economic growth,
societal stability and conflict. Paul Collier wrote, “low income, slow growth, and primary
commodity dependence make a country prone to civil war.” 35 A century of oppressive
colonial and Northern policies left South Sudan primed for yet another civil war.

Lauren Blanchard, Conflict in South Sudan And the Challenges Ahead (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, 2016).
34
Serena Cosgrove, "Conflict and Poverty", 180.
35
Paul Collier, Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 22.
33
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Table 1: Human Development Index Rankings of Selected Countries 36

In a predictable, vicious cycle of violence, the resulting poverty was a significant
factor in the outbreak of violence in 2013. The immediate cause of the South Sudanese
Civil War was a power struggle between President Salva Kiir and his former VicePresident, Riek Machar. However, the strife was exacerbated by ethnic tension
compounded by competition for resources. Despite South Sudan’s abundant natural
resources (75% of Sudan’s Oil Fields are in the South), economic opportunity remains
scarce due to a lack of education and infrastructure. As a result, competition for
resources led to raiding and increased ethnic violence. In an attempt at a transitional
government, the two most powerful men in the cabinet came from the two largest ethnic
tribes, the Dinka and the Neur. When the two men split, they were supported by their
respective ethic groups. President Kiir accused Vice President Machar and his Neur
allies of attempting a coup d’état. Kiir and other Dinka leaders retaliated. The political

"2016 Human Development Reports", Hdr.Undp.Org, last modified 2016, accessed March 15, 2018,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI.
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strife was the match that ignited the kindling of poverty, economic desperation, and
postcolonial devastation.
Conclusion and Ramifications
South Sudan is not unique in its postcolonial history. The Sudanese postcolonial
experience is mirrored in former colonial holdings throughout the Global South. The
practice of artificially elevating specific sects of society through indirect rule creates
unstable power dynamics that often lead the country into civil conflict. This phenomenon
was seen other countries that have experienced postcolonial civil conflict; Congo and
Rwanda under Belgian rule, and French Mali and Chad. The colonial model employed
in these holdings focused on resource extraction, not settlement. In an attempt to
combat the extensive financial and human demands of traditional colonialism,
colonizers began shifting to indirect rule. This colonial framework relies on the
subversion of existing power structures, rather than the creation of new ones. Indirect
rule artificially sustains a hierarchy, often times religious or ethnic, and allows unstable
power structures to survive. Furthermore, it positions those at the top of the hierarchy to
succeed the colonial government in the postcolonial era. These dynamics were very
much in play in postcolonial Sudan.
Britain’s colonial policy in Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium has
directly contributed to the current South Sudanese Civil War. Britain’s colonial
administration favored the economic, political, and human investment of the North, while
largely neglecting the South. In doing so, North Sudan developed at an
incommensurate rate compared to the South. This disparity allowed the North to
implement a hegemonic regime in the postcolonial era. The Northern-dominated
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Sudanese government effectively continued the oppressive policies in regard to South
Sudan, leading to a half-century of civil war. As a result of decades of violence,
underdevelopment, and oppression, South Sudan entered nationhood primed for civil
conflict.
Attempts by the United Nations and the African Union to negotiate an end to the
conflict have been fruitless. A 2014 peace agreement, which aimed to deescalate the
conflict and allow civilians to return to their homes, was broken by both sides less than
24-hours after its signing. 37 In April 2015, Riek Machar was again sworn in as vicepresident as part of a second comprehensive peace agreement. However, less than two
months later, he fled the capital in the wake violent clashes, sparking the renewal of
open conflict. 38 These peace agreements have attempted to address grievances since
war broke out in 2013, without addressing the historical roots and context of the conflict.
Any attempt at long-term stability in South Sudan must derive from bottom-up
approaches to state-building. A pro forma return to the pre-war status quo will only
result in the continued outbreak of violence. Meaningful and long-term peace must stem
from a restorative justice approach to state building. In lieu of strong institutions, it is
critical that South Sudan’s government be truly representative, with voices from all
ethnic groups and social divisions incorporated.

BBC, "South Sudan Ceasefire Violated, Rebels and Government Say", 2018, accessed March 14, 2018,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27362508.
38
Al Jazeera, "South Sudan Opposition Replaces Missing Leader Machar", 2018, accessed March 14, 2018,
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